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The Point System for Organ Distribution 
T.E. Starzl, R. Shapiro, and L. Teperman 
W HEN congressional hearings on transplantation were held by Congressmen Gore and Waxman in the 
autumn of 1983, the full implications were not obvious to 
many who testitied. Support for the proposed legislation was 
organized by Dr Oscar Salvatierra of San Francisco. Those 
who contributed to the Washington support of the legislation 
included officers of the American Society of Transplant 
Surgeons, Norman Shumway on behalf of the thoracic 
surgeons, many of the procurement coordinators, and myself 
(TES). There were three definable objectives. One was to 
increase the supply of organs with a small grants program 
that could strengthen procurement agencies already in exis-
tence or stimulate the development of new programs in 
underserved areas. An almost unnoticed proviso was the 
establishment of a national network for organ distribution. 
The second proposal was to pay for expensive medicines, such 
as the then new immunosuppressive agent cyclosporine. 
which had not yet been released by the FDA but which was 
predicted to be too costly for many patients to afford. The 
third issue was a prohibition on the buying and selling of 
organs. This was a specific response to an unpopular proposal 
by a Virginia physician that a kidney brokerage business be 
established through which recipients could negotiate with 
living donors on a commercial basis. 
THE POLITICIZATION OF TRANSPLANTATION 
There was resistance to the proposed legislation, not only by 
the Republican-dominated executive branch of the govern-
ment but also by powerful professional organizations, such as 
the American Medical Association (AMA) and the Ameri-
can College of Surgeons (ACS). To the conservative AMA 
and ACS, the Gore bill represented an incursion into the 
private practice of medicine and the imposition of controls 
that inevitably would permeate other aspects of medical 
care. 
From the government's point of view, an important con-
cern seemed to be avoidance of responsibility for payment of 
expensive transplantation services beyond those already 
committed in 1972 through the Social Security System for 
the End;Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) Program. Tactically, 
the battle lines were drawn over whether such operations as 
liver transplantation and heart transplantation were "experi-
mental" or "service:' The term "experimental" was an 
administrative convenience for the government bureaucracy, 
since it was used as a shield to deflect attempts to have the 
Social Security or other federal systems pay for extrarenal 
transplants. The undesirable consequence of this strategy 
was that many health insurance carriers cited the govern-
ment position in excusing themselves from their obligation to 
their clients who were caught in the no man's land between 
service and experimental. 
The 1984 Gore bill was passed, but the key issues so 
important to transplant surgeons were not resolved. Extra-
renal transplant procedures remained classified as experi-
mental. The key provision to fund medications was removed 
from the original bill, although it was restored subsequently 
in other legislation. The organ procurement and distribution 
network that already had developed unofficially to the point 
that it was an international model found itself under siege. A 
task force was called for to make recommendations in 
transplantation, including how to distribute organs equita-
bly. Data collection was called for by a separate contract. 
THE JONASSON COMMITTEE 
Implementation of the law was forestalled temporarily by 
ddiberations of the task force, which was instructed to 
complete its work in 6 months. The reasonable and temperate 
White Paper eventually developed by this group (Chaired by 
Dr Olga Jonasson, now of Ohio State University) provided 
broad guidelines by which organ distribution should take 
place. The task force categorically rejected discrimination on 
the basis of sex, race, or economic class. It urged caution in 
giving any weight to such criteria as age, lifestyle, the 
presence of a social network, or other factors that merely 
could be judgments of social worth. 
THE UNOS CONTRACT AND THE POINT SYSTEM 
FOR KIDNEYS 
In compliance with the Gore law, a contract was let in 1986 
to establish a national organ procurement and distribution 
network. The contractor by law was the federal agency, The 
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). The con-
tractee was the United Network for Organ Sharing 
(UNOS). a previously private and nonprofit organization. 
UNOS, in its turn, had been an offshoot of a regional 
network called the South Eastern Organ Procurement Foun-
dation (SEOPF). UNOS committees that attempted to 
develop an organ distribution plan were unable to reach a 
consensus as the deadline of May 1987 for submission of the 
plan to HCFA approached. 
Meanwhile, a point system for renal transplantation 
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POINT SYSTEM FOR ORGAN DISTRIBUTION 
already had been developed in Pittsburgh in the autumn of 
1985 that gave credit points to aspiring kidney recipients. 
Credits were acquired for time waiting, quality of antigen 
match, degree of immunologic sensitization, medical urgen-
cy, and logistical considerations of getting the donor organ 
and the recipient together within the time limitations of safe 
organ preservation. 
The system of kidney allocation had been in effcct in 
western Pennsylvania since January 1, 1986. Because the 
results were encouraging, I the Pittsburgh plan was presented 
to the UNOS Board of Directors for national use to beginon 
November 1, 1987, and was accepted without change. At the 
same time, the Board of Directors of UNOS established a 
national kidney transplant registry on the framework of the 
old UCLA data registry that had been in existence for 
several years previously. 
Administrative Features 
The point system accepted by the UNOS Board of Directors 
contained three important principles. The first was that of 
regional primacy, which gave the right of first usage of a 
kidney to the procurement area where the organ was 
obtained, with secondary refusal rights to anyone else in the 
same UNOS region. After passing through these check-
points, the organ was released to the national pool. The only 
exception to regional primacy was in the event of a 6-antigen 
(perfect) match elsewhere in the country. 
The second principle was the primacy of physician judg-
ment in rejecting a kidney offer if proceeding with its use was 
thought to be inappropriate. The third principle was that 
patients had a right to select transplantation centers locally 
or at a distance in a "sunshine" atmosphere in which all 
matters of transplant policy were completely open to the 
public. 
A Lightning Rod Effect 
Far from settling disputes about kidney allocation, the point 
system has created a battleground for vested interests and 
viewpoints of great range and complexity. Even before the 
point system was given a preliminary national trial, regional 
and local variances were submitted to the procurement and 
distribution committee of UNOS. These variances, which 
were accepted for the most part, made the overall system 
fragmented and heterogeneous. Analyses were thereby 
inhibited that might have shown if any of the factors used to 
compute points for the recipient scores would affect graft or 
patient life survival curves either favorably or adversely. In 
discussing the unanswered questions, including the value of 
typing among other considerations, we fall back on our own 
use of the original point system, since this experience 
preceded by almost 2 years the implementation of the system 
by other centers. 
Antigen Matching 
The chance to discuss unanswered questions is particularly 
timely, since the point system has survived conceptually. 
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However, at the meeting last month (February, 1989) of the 
Board of Directors of UNOS, broad changes were made that 
increased the weight given to antigen matching and mini-
mized the importance of time waiting. Were these changes 
justified? During the last year, a number of large centers or 
regional consortia have reported the results of typing versus 
outcome. In practically all of these trials, matching had no 
influence on the results. Reports that have claimed a signifi-
cant effect of typing have come from such data pools as those 
compiled by Opelz2 and Cook and Terasaki.l In June 1988, 
Opelz's report in the New England Journal of Medicine 
provoked an editorial by Salvatierra, who cited evidence 
from most of the largest US centers that typing was irrele-
vant.4 Cook and Terasaki's report, published in the same 
month,l had been presented at an international cyclosporine 
conference at which none of the centers or regional centers 
(two United States and two European) that reported from 
the same podium could see a matching effect. 
At our own center in the first 418 bellwether cases in 
which the point system was used in 1986 and 1987, there was 
no significant difference at any level of matching, from 
perfect to poorest. 5 
The original point system conceded that typing could have 
a subtle but important influence on early or late outcome. 
Some upgrading in the frequency of less than perfect 
matches was assured by awarding 2 points for each of the 6 
antigens of the class 1 and class II systems. In addition, all 
6-antigen-matched kidneys were placed immediately in a 
national pool. From this experience, had it been completed, a 
comparison would have been available between the ideal 
conditions of a 6-antigen match and all other levels of 
matching. Such data already have been compiled, but the 
publication in January in the UNOS newsletter of prelimi-
nary results sent shock waves through the typing community 
when the perfectly matched organs enjoyed no advantage.6 
What if the sweeping changes passed by the Board of 
Directors of UNOS in February 1989 were unjustified? If so, 
the directorship may have institutionalized a prejudice 
("typing counts") as passionately held as some of the others 
that have been overthrown or inadequately supported. These 
shibboleths include a major influence of race ("blacks do 
badly"), age, diabetes, lupus erythematosus, and sex. If 
typing is not a valid and practical instrument of donor-
recipient matching, think of the consequences that a small 
group of determined lobbyists will have imposed on society. 
First, the fairness of giving high value for waiting will be 
undermined for specious reasons. Second, the principle of 
regional primacy and the incentive for organ procurement 
that this brings to local programs will be eroded by greatly 
increasing the number of kidneys that must be exported. 
Third, the nightmare envisioned by Rapapore of organs 
compiling ischemia time while being rushed around from city 
to city at great expense but with no biologic advantage will 
become reality. Finally, the typing itself, while perpetuating 
the dreams and ambitions of a few hundred or a few 
thousand typers or transplant surgeons and physicians, will 
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b':Lome an instrument of social injustice to the extent that 
nit: distribution patterns are distorted. The first question to 
be asked is if ethnic minorities, specifically blacks, will be 
placed at a disadvantage by the new emphasis on matching. 
For those who disapprove of such expressions of concern, 
let us state that we do not believe it possible or wise to turn 
the clock back to before the February Board of Directors 
meeting. This time, we must do the experiment. We must 
look at the results of the new point system pitilessly, critical-
ly, and under audit. Within a relatively short time and on the 
b:.lsis of the results, we must make whatever course adjust-
ments are required. There has never becn this kind of 
opportunity to have a clc:.In answer about typing. The use of 
variances, gerrymandering of regions, and other devices to 
avoid doing the experiment should be resisted. At the end of 
the observation period, the cottage industry of typing may be 
strengthened, or it may be made into a shadow of its present 
prominence and influence. It does not really matter what the 
result is, since special interests in this field have become an 
inconsequential drop in the sea of humanity that we are 
expeeted to serve. 
Immunosuppression and Race 
The point system in its previous life and also today not only is 
colorblind but also has no way of avoiding old, frail, immuno-
logically difficult, or otherwise bad-risk recipients. Between 
January I, 1986, and June 1988,505 patients were treated 
with cadaveric kidney transplantation at the University of 
Pittsburgh after being selected by the point system. All but 
42 were adults, who averaged 42.4 ± 12.8 (SO) years; 22% of 
these were diabetic. Fifteen percent of the 505 patients had 
panel reactive antibodies (PRA) greater than 40% and were 
considered highly sensitized. 
The results with all 505 recipients are reported elsewhere.5 
The mortality after 9 months to 3 1/4 years is 7.9%, and 
75% of those who started are dialysis free. OKT3 for 
steroid-resistant rejection was available throughout the study 
period 8 A 10 to 15% better graft survival at 1 year was 
obtained with triple-drug therapy (cyc\osporine, prednisone, 
and azathioprine) than with cyclosporine and prednisone 
alone. s Using triple-drug therapy, the I-year graft survival 
after primary cadaveric transplantation was 88%, and after 
retransplantation it was 75%. The retransplantation group 
had a large proportion of sensitized patients. 
In this 30-month time period, 75 (14.2%) of the kidneys 
used were given to black recipients, and 1 % were used for 
other minorities 9 The percentage of black patients was 
somewhat higher than the black constituency of Pittsburgh 
and its surrounding areas, probably because of a higher 
incidence of renal disease in this ethnic group. Graft and 
patient survival in the black population was equivalent to 
that in the other patients,9 contrary to popular belief and a 
number of published reports from other centers. 10·15 
The effect of the point system was to diminish judgmental 
factors in case selection. which in the past probably had 
operated to the disadvantage of "undesirable" potential 
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recipients, including older ones and possibly ethnic minori-
ties. 16•17 The consequences of ad hoc selection have been 
particularly well documented in the University of Minneso-
ta- Mayo Clinic experience, in which an unmistakable bias 
against older, female, and black recipients was revealed. lo 
Although the Minnesota approach has been defended by 
Fryd lS on the basis that it ensures optimal use of kidneys, the 
results and observations with the Pittsburgh point system 
have provided assurance that the concepts of equitable access 
and effieient use of a scarce resource are not mutually 
exclusive. 
EXTRARENAL ORGANS 
During the congressional hearings of 19R3, kidney sharing 
did not make headlines. Far more dramatic was the appear-
ance of pitiful, jaundiced children who were brought with 
their anguished parents to the witness table. Until then, there 
had been little effort or pressure to support patients finan-
cially who needed new livers and hearts or to find organs in a 
procurement network run by kidney transplant surgeons with 
understandable proprietary interests and attitudes. The 
obvious need to look after indigent patients who had no 
catastrophic health insurance activated alarm buttons in a 
Washington bureaucracy that had perceived for the first 
time in history (or at least in recent years) the need for 
frugality and a balanced budget at exactly the same time as 
the expensive new technology of liver and heart transplanta-
tion arrived. 
How to pay for extrarenal transplantation has not yet been 
resolved satisfactorily. In order to be on a waiting list for a 
liver or heart, it is necessary to have a financial commitment 
from someone. Angel candidates could be a health insurance 
carrier, a state government or other agency, a private bene-
factor, or a fund-raising organization. How many people 
cannot find an angel and do not make it to the list is not 
known, but each example becomes a source of shame and 
sorrow. Suffice it to say that many transplantation centers 
have surreptitiously underwritten the cost of liver or heart 
transplantation, fearful that their good deeds will be discov-
ered and make their hospital an indigency capital to which 
other patients with a similar plight will flock. 
For liver candidates who make it to the list, a point system 
that also was developed in Pittsburgh l9 and applied nation-
ally has served remarkably well. The concept of the point 
system for liver allocation is the same as that for kidneys, but 
with far greater emphasis on medical urgency and logistic 
factors. The principles of regional primacy, physician judg-
ment as a final arbiter, and thc patient right of center 
selection were retained. 
The principle of regional primacy may have been unusu-
ally important because without it new centers attempting to 
get started with so-called elective patients could find it 
difficult or impossible to obtain organs in spite of the most 
effective local organ procurement efforts. Under the present 
system, organs can be used preferentially by the procuring 
center and within a region before being entered into the 
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remaining national pool, which is composed of the othcr nine 
regions and Canada. 
When the point systcm was installed for livers in Pitts-
burgh in June 1987, the limits of hcpatic cold ischemia werc 
still in the 6 to 8 hour range. Consequently, points were 
awarded for proximity of donor and recipient to the trans-
plant center that was providing care. Now that the new UW 
prcservation solution has made possible the safe preservation 
of livers for up to a da\.20 the logistic factor has lost its 
biologic importanc.:,': Jnd some day it may b.: eliminated. 
Whether <l liver is used locally. regionally. or nationally, 
the overriding point totals given for the various stag.:s of 
urgency ensure that the sickest patient will be given the liver 
at any of the local. regional, and national checkpoints. 
Originally. there were h stagcs l9 A recent change to a 4-tier 
urgency classilication will not really change the pattern of 
distribution very much. A 4-tier urgency svstem is used in 
many parts of Europe. 
The Effect of the Point System on Liver Transplantation 
The point system for liver recipient selection went into effcct 
in January 1987. Since then, the actuarial I-year survival 
has been no different than it was from 1980 through 1986.22 
although the number of older patients has increased substan-
tially. The reason is that the point system does not recognize 
age as a necessary exclusion factor any more than it recog-
nizes sex. 
The point system is also color-blind for liver recipients. for 
which reason it was intcresting to see the percentage of black 
recipients before and after adoption of the point system. The 
black contribution to the recipient population has not varied 
much from year to year and was not really changed by use of 
the point system.22 In the total case collection of 1458 
patients treated from 1981 to 1988, 8.4% were black and 
6.5% were other minorities, for a total of 14.9%. The global 
life survival in the pooled 1981 to 1988 cases was the same in 
the black recipients as with the other minorities or white 
reci pients. 22 
The Thoracic Organs 
At the beginning of November 1987, the same allocation 
plan used for livers was adapted by UNOS for heart 
programs, the only difference being in the details of medical 
urgency. The system was promptly dismantled by subcom-
mittees of dissatisfied heart surgeons who believed that only 
the categories of (I) catastrophic urgency and (2) elective 
should be used. The opening of more than 100 new heart 
transplant centers has enormously complicated the problem 
of cardiac procurement and distribution, has reduced the 
activity of the larger centers to a SUboptimal level. and has 
engendercd serious dissatisfaction at many levels of these 
activities. 
INTERCONTINENTAL SHARING OF LIVERS 
The medical and cultur,l\ relationships with Canada are so 
close that our northern neighbors are considcred for adminis-
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trative purposes to constitute Region II. Conversations have 
been authorized and encouraged bet ween European and 
American centers undcr the aegis of UNOS. A meeting for 
this purpose was held in Paris on March 6, 1989, at which 
representatives were present from Eurotransplant (Pichl-
mayr and Persijn). the Frcnch network (Bismuth). the 
United Kingdom (Caine), and Scandiatransplant (Groth). 
Mr Brian Broznick (procurement chief, Pittsburgh). Dr 
Andreas Tzakis, and 1 [TES] came from the United States. 
The consensus of the group was that livers were being wasted 
in both Europe and the United States and that to transport 
these organs efTcctively would rcquire very personal commu-
nications betwecn specific centers in a pilot project and only 
after making sure that the organs were not needed on the 
originating side of 1 he Atlantic. What was surprising was the 
very limited sharing that is going at present among the 
European networks. For example, the Eurotransplant group 
(German-speaking countries and Holland) sent only 18 livers 
to other European regions in 1988 while using 345. Appar-
ently. Eurotransplant was the largest importer, having 
obtained 51 livers from outside the region. The present 
Eurotransplant waiting list is 124 patients, of whom 17 are 
urgent, 81 elective. and 26 inactive. 
I f intercontinental sharing can be developed, it will be by 
the trial and error pathway by which sharing between the 
United States and Canada was done only a few years ago. It 
was agreed by the participants that there would have to be 
centercto-center communication in the pilot project. 
HAS UNOS FAILED? 
Where UNOS fits into these efforts remains to be clarified. 
UNOS seems to have become a political punching bag, 
caught between the expectations of the liberal and the 
conservative political philosophies. Its policies have been 
further molded by the maneuvering and lobbying of some of 
it~ members. often those who are least knowledgeable about 
and involved in clinical services. Unfortunately, these strug-
gles have obscured the role of the UNOS directorship. many 
of whose members are not expert in the specifics of the field 
that they now govern. 
At a recent meeting of the American Council of Trans-
plantation (ACT), an important member of the staff of a 
United States Senator pronounced UNOS to be a failure in 
spite of its prodigious accomplishments. A highly public 
power struggle has developed between UNOS and its con-
tractor (HCF A) about many issues, including who is really 
responsible for the setting of standards and the enforcement 
of these standards. At the heart of this conflict is control over 
financial payments. 
Meanwhile, efforts go on to gerrymander and redefine the 
regions of UNOS, frequently at the initiative of tissue typers 
with a strong interest in maintaining previously established 
regional networks and collaborations (SEOPF, for example) 
that are inimical to central UNOS objectives. The avalanche 
of paper that is sent from UNOS has become almost too 
voluminous to read and too bulky to file. However, it may be 
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hoped that these are growing pains in view of what has been 
accomplished. After all, there is in place a national system 
that may be stronger than ever in its most essential ingre-
dient---{;ommunication. After analyzing the US transplant 
practices, Singer, a Canadian physician and Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation Fellow wrote23 : 
... renal transplant policy (through UNOS) has become a 
model of political fairness and empowerment that could inform 
other aspects of the health care system in the United States .... 
The language of justice, access, fairness, equity, and political 
empowerment should not remain restricted to the area of renal 
transplantation. Rather, renal transplantation could serve as 
the ideological springboard for a system of national health care 
to ensure equitable access to medical care for all citizens of the 
United States. 
Whether this accolade will continue to be deserved remains 
to be seen. 
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